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After the infamous attacks of September 11 in 2001, air transportation security has been 
made the top priority of policymaking agenda by government agencies, particularly the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). While security measures of commercial airports have 
been improved dramatically, FAA FAR 139 Class IV non-commercial airports remain somewhat 
ignored, as there is a minimal security requirement. In fact, the security of non-commercial or 
general aviation airports is equally critical because large transport category aircraft (TCA), such 
as Boeing 737- 800, intermittently operate out of some of these airports. For instance, many 
NCAA member universities charter large TCA at GA airports carrying athletics, staff, luggage 
and equipment to and from various destinations. While terrorist attacks on a large TCA at a Class 
IV non-commercial airport has never happened, the lack of adequate security measures could 
invite potential terrorists to take advantage of an airport’s insufficient security measure. This 
project uses Delphi methodology in conjunction with a series of surveys and observations on GA 
airports that do not serve commercial air carriers but, from time to time, accommodate large 
TCA for NCAA member universities. This research yields a list of possible airport 
vulnerabilities when large aircraft are present, followed by security recommendations to mitigate 







Aviation security has changed significantly since 9/11. Before 9/11, security checkpoints 
and equipment were in place to primarily look for bombs, not hijackers. Passenger screening 
allowed small sharp articles like cardboard cutters or nail clippers to be carried onboard aircraft. 
Inspections fell upon the airport and airlines to hire and staff security personnel for screening 
luggage and passengers. These duties were often contracted out to private security firms. The 
FAA’s main role was to provide information concerning threats, establish policies, conduct 
audits of the airports and airlines, develop new technologies, supervise new equipment 
installation at airports, etc. On aircraft, only a small thin door secured the cockpit. Federal air 
marshals were rarely onboard and thus could not effectively intervene in the event of a severe 
disturbance once airborne. The FAA approved Common Strategy tactic dealt with disruptive 
behavior, physically abusive behavior, life-threatening behavior, and attempted or actual breach 
of flight deck, and was used by the airlines as a means of assessing threats while crews were 
trained to comply with the demands of the hijackers (Harrison 2008). 
Literature Review 
On the fateful day of September 11th, 2001, four aircraft were hijacked successfully by men with 
small box cutters. These terrorists were able to make their way into the cockpit by sheer force 
and the flight crew’s offered minimal resistance based on the FAA’s Common Strategy guidance. 
Three of those planes were used as large missiles to crash into the World Trade Center and 
Pentagon. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (i.e. the 9/11 
Commission) was tasked with determining what exactly occurred on that fateful day and to 
provide recommendations to prevent another tragedy from occurring again. As suggested by the 
4	  	  
report, the TSA must implement a multi-layered security system that takes into consideration the 
full array of possible terrorist tactics. The 9/11 Commission noted that these, “various layers of 
security must each be effective in their own right and must be coordinated with other layers in a 
manner that creates redundancies to catch possible security lapses” (Elias 2004, p. 3). As a result, 
new security rules and programs were introduced to the industry. 
Commercial Airport Security 
The security laws and associated mechanisms for commercial or major airports are practical and 
have been dramatically improved since 9/11. In the U.S., commercial airports operate routine 
revenue flights for passengers, cargo or both and are regulated by Title 49 Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR) Chapter XII, part 1540– 1562. The FAA FAR Part 139, Class IV non-
commercial airports are exempt due to only serving unscheduled passenger operations of large 
air carrier aircraft (GAO 2009). There are also other recommended security programs in addition 
to the aforementioned security rules for airports and air carriers to conduct passenger and cargo 
security checks. For instance, Aviation Direct Access Screening Program (ADASP) requires all 
employees to possess an identification badge for access to secured/sterile areas and properties, 
Air Operations Areas (AOAs), aircraft, or cargo. The Visual Intermodal Prevention and 
Response (VIPR) based on the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 expands security power outside 
airport terminals, mainly for the detection of explosives, weapons or possible terrorist activities 
(DHS OIG 2007; Price and Forrest 2009). 
Pursuant to security rules, Title 49 CFR 1542 Airport Security, CFR 1544 Security for 
Air Carriers and Scheduled Operators and CFR 1546 Security for Foreign Air Carriers are the 
primary sections for air commerce safety. Title 49 CFR 1542, 1544, and 1546 regulate 
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commercial airports, scheduled and charter air carriers using aircraft weighted of more MTOW 
12,500 lbs. must possess security measures and screenings on passengers, luggage, and cargo. 
Each airport that regularly provides service for scheduled commercial aircraft operators must 
enact CFR 1542 airport security program in conjunction with CFR 1544 for US-based air 
carriers/commercial operators and CFR 1546 for foreign air carriers. Airports and individual who 
receive a Security Directive or Information Circular must also comply with the security rules of 
CFR 1542 including: 1) qualified airport security coordinator(s) (ASCs), 2) allowing TSA’s 
security inspection, and 3) all general security measures upon cargo and passengers. For aircraft 
with a maximum takeoff weight (MTOW) greater than 100,000 lbs., the security measures for air 
carriers include: metal detection devices, x-Ray system, security coordinators, law enforcement 
personnel accessible weapons, criminal history background checks, training for security 
coordinators, training for individuals with security duties, bomb or air piracy threats security 
directives and the compliance of subpart E of Title 49 CFR Part 149 Screener Qualifications. 
In addition, in Title 49 CFR 1550 Aircraft Security under General Operating and Flight 
Rules, part 1550.3 allows TSA security inspection in compliance with 49 CFR 1520 (for Air 
Carriers and Commercial Operators) and 49 U.S.C. Subtitle VII (rules of Air Commerce and 
Safety). Title 49 CFR 1550.5 regulates the activities around the Airport Sterile Area. This 
requires an aircraft search and passenger, crewmember, other individuals and their accessible 
property (carry-on items) to be screened before boarding in accordance with security procedures 
approved by TSA. CFR 1550.5 affects non-commercial carriers or aircraft operators that are 
more likely to be corporate operators or private aircraft owners (GPO 2008, p. 377). According 
to CFR 1550.5(b) operations not falling into the rules of CFR 1544 and 1546 must follow CFR 
1550 if passengers, crewmembers, or other individuals are enplaned from or deplaned into a 
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sterile area. Air carriers are required to complete this security requirement. Specifically, they 
must conduct a search of the aircraft, screen passengers, crewmembers, and other individuals and 
their accessible property (carry-on items) before boarding in accordance with security procedures 
approved by TSA. CFR 1550 also extends to aircraft of 12,500 lbs. or more and states: “(a) ... 
each aircraft operation conducted in an aircraft with a maximum certificated takeoff weight of 
12,500 lbs. or more except for those operations specified in CFR 1550.5 and those operations 
conducted under a security program under part 1544 or 1546 of this chapter” should “conduct a 
search of the aircraft before departure and screen passengers, crewmembers, and other persons 
and their accessible property (carry-on items) before boarding in accordance with security 
procedures approved by TSA” (GPO 2008, p.377). Therefore, if an aircraft with a MTOW of 
greater than 12,500 lbs. is operated at a Sterile Area of an airport, it is the air carrier, not the 
airport, who should also comply with the security rules of 1544 and 1546 for commercial 
operators. Most interestingly, FAA FAR 139 Class IV non-commercial airports do not 
necessarily need to define Sterile Areas or AOAs and therefore there is no need for GA airports 
to comply with the aforementioned laws. 
Current GA Mandatory Security Programs 
While there are safety considerations at GA airports to minimize the risk of inadvertent access to 
the runway and AOA in order to separate the public from aircraft there is no security rules for 
FAR 139 Class IV airports. Although there is no security requirement for GA airports, there are 
several mandatory security programs for airport users such as charter carriers, or corporate 
aviation operators as regulated in CFR 1544.101(d) Twelve-Five Standard Security Program, 
part 1544.101(f) Private Charter Program (GPO 2008, p. 333), DCA Access Standard Security 
Program, and the Maryland-Three Program. 
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Private Charter Security Safety Program (PCSSP)  
The PCSSP is applicable to private charters for passenger service using aircraft with 
MTOW of 45,500 kg (100,309.3 lbs.), or with a passenger-seating configuration of 61 or more. 
The security requirements are similar to scheduled air carriers, which include metal detection 
devices, X-ray systems, security coordinators, law enforcement personnel, accessible weapons, 
criminal history record checks, training for security coordinators and crewmembers, training for 
individuals with security-related duties, bomb or air piracy threats, security directives, and all of 
subpart E of 49 CFR Part 1544. The PCSSP includes the mandatory security items under 
1544.201, .207, .209, .211, .215, .217, .219, .225, .229, .230, .233, .235, 303, and 305. Yet, 
aircraft weighing more than 12,500 lbs. are required to follow Twelve-Five Security Standard 
Program (GPO 2008, p.333; NBAA 2005). These security requirements are done by air carriers 
not the airports. 
Twelve-five Security Standard Program (TFSSP)  
The TFSSP was initially published by the TSA in 2002 in the hope to regulate scheduled 
air carriers and charters operating aircraft of more than 12,500 lbs. MTOW per se. The TFSSP 
“is applicable to scheduled and charter (passenger and cargo) operations to, from, within, or 
outside the United States that use aircraft with a maximum certificated takeoff weight (MTOW) 
of more than 12,500 lbs.” (GPO 2008, p.332). Security measures under TFSSP include: flight 
crews’ criminal history check (CHRC), baggage screening, passenger identification, restricted 
access to flight deck etc. (GPO 2008, p.333). The TFSSP contains security items under 
1544.217, .219, .223, .230, .235, .237, .301(a)(b), .303, .305 (p.333). In 2004, aircraft weighing 
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12,500 lbs. or less were excluded from TFSSP (DHS OIG 2009; NBAA 2005). Again, air 
carriers, not the airports, fulfill these security requirements.  
DCA Access Standard Security Program (DASSP)  
The DCA Access Standard Security Program (DCASSP) was announced by the TSA on 
July 19, 2005 to allow general aviation access to DC Ronald Reagan Airport via application and 
TSA’s approval. There are three formats of GA operations that can apply to access DCA 
including: Aircraft with passenger seats more than 31 but less than 60 can apply under 49 CFR 
1544.101(b), heavy operators under TSA’s approval based on 49 CFR 1544.101(f), operators 
under 49 CFR 1544.101(d) with TSA’s approval of TFSSP, and corporate aircraft owned and 
operated by the company (DHS OIG 2009; GPO 2005; NBAA 2009a, b). 
 Maryland-three Program  
Because Washington D.C. Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) and Flight Restricted 
Zone (FRZ) are mandatory for all aircraft, the Maryland-Three Program was established to allow 
pilots to fly to or from these general aviation airports within the ADIZ (TSA 2010). These 
airports include: College Park (CGS), Potomac Airfield (VKX) and Hyde Executive Field (W32). 
Not only do these airports conduct flight training, but also provide corporate aviation and charter 
services. In this case, PCSSP and DASSP are mandatory (DHS OIG 2009; TSA 2010). 
Non-commercial Airport Security 
There currently is no security rules associated with GA or FAA FAR 139 Class IV non-
commercial airports (no scheduled commercial services for cargo or passengers). From the list of 
TSA’s GA security priorities, smuggling (illegal drugs, goods, and immigrants), flight training 
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and aircraft theft are their three main concerns. The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association 
(AOPA) and the TSA collaboratively designed and currently promote the Airport Watch 
program. This program not only provides security education to airport personnel and aircraft 
operators, but also equips warning signs and conducts student pilot background checks. The GA 
Aviation Vulnerability Identification Self-Assessment Tool (GA-VISAT) allows GA airports to 
discover internal security weaknesses. Yet GA-VISAT is a voluntary online evaluation tool and 
is not available as the time of this study. Depending on the category of operation, GA airport 
security relies completely on air carriers or charters. Even though FAA FAR 139 Class IV non-
commercial airports do not have any mandatory security programs, they are encouraged to 
provide their own suitable security program such as TSA’s Security Guidelines for GA Airports. 
Security Guidelines for GA Airports 
The Security Guidelines for GA Airports provides security information about personnel, 
aircraft, airport facilities, surveillance equipment, security plan items and designs, and special 
security events. The Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) believes aircraft operated 
around GA airports present low-level threats to the National Airspace System (NAS) due to the 
size, payload and characteristics of the aircraft. Therefore, the security plans imposed on large 
commercial airports are not appropriate for GA airport use. Their economic feasibility could not 
support such an intensive security requirement (TSA 2004). Although this guideline suggests 
basic security measures for GA airports, the Executive Summary states: “The document does not 
contain regulatory language nor is it intended to suggest that any recommendations or guidelines 
should be considered a mandatory requirement” (TSA 2004, p. iii). This statement simply shows 




This security program contains basic information and Security Assessment Items (SAIs) 
that helps GA operators and FBOs to identify potential security threats to their operation. For 
operators, the SAIs includes aircraft security, hangar security, visitors, and suspicious personnel 
activities. The GA Airport Watch and Security Hotline 1866-GA-SECURE are also introduced. 
For FBOs, the SAIs includes: hangar security measures (ramps, lights and cameras), transit pilots, 
suspicious activities and personnel, security coordinator, coordinator security training, and 
aircraft security (AOPA 2010). 
Secure fixed base operators program (SFBOP) 
The voluntary SFBOP program was initiated as an international collaboration between 
USA and Ireland for public-private fixed-base operators to check passenger and crew 
identification against manifests or eAPIS, providing another layer of security. The information 
for the flight includes the flight itinerary, names of flight crewmembers and aircraft operator, 
aircraft tail number and model (excluding the identification of the passengers onboard) (DHS 
OIG 2009). 
Large aircraft security program (LASP) 
The LASP was proposed under the TSA’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) 
outlined in the Federal Register Vol. 73, issue 211 on October 30, 2008 wanting to mandate 
airports, private charter or corporate aircraft weighing more than 12,500 lbs. to install TSA-
approved security programs. The security program for aircraft, if MTOW is more than 12,500 
lbs., security should include: 1) flight crew’s CHRC, 2) Watch-List matching, and 3) biennial 
audit via third-party groups. For aircraft weighing more than 100,309 MTOW, additional 
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security checks should include passenger check. This program was under the NPRM 
announcement soliciting external comments. Airports conducting regular charter services in this 
area should provide security programs helping air carriers conduct a thorough security check 
using Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program (AOSSP) (TSA 2008). 
While there is no security requirement for the FAA FAR 139 Class IV non- commercial 
airports, it does not say that there is no vulnerability associated with GA airport operations that 
could lead to mishaps, fatalities, or accidents. In 2007, Jeremy Rogalski published a report 
concerning Houston area GA airport security. In his report, he outlined numerous GA security 
gaps. Mr. Rogalski was able to freely access the airport ramp through a secured gate via the 
intercom. He then walked up and touched a Comair regional jet located on an unsecured ramp. 
The airport was also found to have no fence in a section of the perimeter (Rogalski 2009). These 
regional jets may not be used to crash into large buildings due to their diminutive size, but could 
be used to crash into chemical plants and their respective storage tanks causing massive damage, 
casualties or injuries (Rogalski 2009). 
Research Questions 
Although there are no mandatory security programs for FAA FAR 139 Class IV non- 
commercial airports, large aircraft do use these airports for charter services, such as NCAA 
member universities who use GA airports nearby universities to transport athletics and 
equipment. While the H.R. 3093 General Aviation Security Enhancement Act 2009 has been 
introduced by Congress and the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) of Large Aircraft 
Security Program (LASP) is under discussion as of the date of this study, the purpose of this 
study aims to answer two important questions: 
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1. Without mandatory security enforcement, what is (are) the security measure(s) implemented 
by the FAA FAR 139 Class IV non-commercial airports when a large charter airliner is present? 
2. While there is no mandatory security program or rule for FAA FAR 139 Class IV non-
commercial airports, what could be the vulnerability affecting airport security when a large 
charter airliner is present? 
Research Methodology 
This study applies a two-stage process: Stage-1 onsite field study, observations and a 
personal interview and Stage-2 an online survey to selected airports for inputs and verification. 
To discover the possible security vulnerabilities of GA airports accommodating large aircraft, a 
field study and several onsite observations on a GA airport used by a NCAA University during 
passenger boarding/deplaning process was conducted. The finding from Stage-1 yielded a basis 
of questionnaire (See Appendix A) in conjunction with the findings extracted from 
Transportation Research Board (TRB) Airport Cooperation Research Program (ACRP) Synthesis 
Report 3 (TRB 2007) and related literature reviews. During the Stage-2 survey, the FAA FAR 
139 Class IV non-commercial airports used by NCAA member universities chartering large 
airliners are selected as the research sample. To find all National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(NCAA) Division I teams throughout the United States, ESPN and NCAA websites were utilized 
to retrieve a list of twelve conferences totaling 120 teams. NCAA’s website also provides the 
location of each member university. This information was then used in Google maps to 
determine the proximity of airports nearby the colleges. For an airport to be listed it must be 
within 25 miles of a college and have a minimum runway length of 5,000 feet. Skyvector website 
was then used to search for any additional airports around the area of the college by means of a 
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sectional aeronautical map. Next, FlightAware and airport websites were used to determine if the 
selected airports had routine commercial or only large charter operations. This was an extremely 
time-consuming task as FlightAware only had around 2 weeks worth of data available. To 
finalize the research sample providing no routine commercial service but occasionally 
accommodating large charter aircraft for NACC member universities, airport services were 
reviewed during the height of the college football season (September to November) as many 
NCAA Division I teams travelled via chartered aircraft. For instance, Pennsylvania State 
University uses University Park Airport, which also provides routine commercial operations. In 
this case, University Park Airport is not selected, as the security rules of 49 CFR 1544 must be 
complied. A total of seven airports were confirmed to have used charters for recent away NCAA 
football games in addition to fifteen airports classified as FAR 139 Class IV GA airports without 
scheduled airline services. Airport contact information was retrieved from the FAA including 
airport manager and owner address, telephone, and airport classification information. Delphi 
Technique for data creditability was used. 
Findings 
To answer the two proposed questions, this section provides two reports including results of 
Stage-1 field study and Stage-2 survey. 
Stage-1 Findings 
Q1. Without mandatory security enforcement, what is (are) the security measure(s) implemented 
by FAA FAR 139 Class IV non-commercial airports when a large charter airliner is present? 
From the Stage-1 process, the authors audited and conducted onsite observations between 
August 2008 and November 2009 when large charter aircraft were present. As it stands, the 
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observed airport is a FAA Part 139, Class IV non-commercial airport that is not required to 
arrange a sterile area for the embarking/disembarking of its passenger or to define Air Operations 
Areas (AOAs) when large charter aircraft are present. Large aircraft like Boeing 737- 800, 
Boeing 757, and Airbus 320 aircraft were observed readily accessible from both the airport 
terminal and ramp upon arrival and subsequent departure later in the evening from the observed 
airport. A private security firm was hired by charter carriers to provide physical screening of 
passengers and associated carry- on items by hand-held metal detectors. There was no 
observance of large luggage check-in or over-size equipment being screened before being loaded 
onto the aircraft cargo bay. There was one police officer in attendance during the operation; 
however, no firearms were observed on the officer’s person. It was later learned that one police 
officer travels on all flights with the football team for security reasons. It is understood that this 
officer did not need to have the prerequisite training to carry a loaded weapon inside the aircraft 
cabin per CFR 1544.219 Carriage of Accessible Weapons. Another important observation of the 
charter operation shows that athletic players and team managers taking luggage off the conveyor 
belt. This is in direct violation of CFR 1544.203,” Each aircraft operator must use the procedures 
in its security program to control checked baggage that it accepts for transport on an aircraft, in a 
manner that: Prevents access by persons other than an aircraft operator employee or its agent 
(GPO 2008).” Also a chartered B737 was left unattended on the ramp overnight. Air stairs were 
located approximately 20 feet from the forward left aircraft door. As understood, the B737 does 
not have a lock to exterior doors, but does lock the Kevlar cockpit door to prevent unauthorized 
access. Catering trucks came through the entrance of the local FBO freely and loaded food and 
drinks to the aircraft without inspection. This unsupervised access to the aircraft may allow the 
opportunity for unspecified weapons or dangerous substances to be introduced to the aircraft. 
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Furthermore, sabotage to aircraft equipment or potential could have occurred. Without a 
systematic risk management or regulatory enforcement of security programs, each FAR 139 
Class IV airport possesses its own security format to mitigate its particular security challenges. 
Although without a regulatory enforcement of security programs, each GA airport possesses its 
own security characteristics that may only apply to that particular entity. The authors also 
interviewed the airport manager to understand the security measures of the observed airport. 
Based on the feedback of the airport manager, the authors had summarized that: 
1. The primary activity of the observed towered GA airport is student flight training and 
corporate aviation services; 
2. NCAA athletic teams like basketball, football, baseball, volleyball, and marching band 
chartered Boeing 737-500 (MTOW ≥ 133,500 lbs.), Boeing 757 (MTOW ≥ 220,000 lbs.), Airbus 
320 series (MTOW ≥ 130,000 lbs.), Dornier 328Jet (MTOW > 34,500 lbs.) and Embraer 145 
(MTOW ≥ 44,000 lbs.) to commute to their destinations for sports conferences from this airport; 
3. Military aircraft such as F-18 and T-35 were invited to the airport on a variety of occasions 
and remained overnight; 
4. A local FBO provides aircraft rental, fuel, catering services and ground supports during the 
operation of large charter flights; 
5. There is no mandatory security measure enforcing FAA FAR 139 Class IV non-commercial 
airports; 
6. Charter carriers were responsible for flight operation and security measures (TFSSP and 
PCSSP), while the university provided ground transportation to and from the sports complex; 
16	  	  
7. Passengers were identified by air carriers with the manifest provided by their group leader and 
then checked by pilots; & 
8. Private contractors hired by air carriers to conduct passenger screenings;  
9. Airport Watch program and a direct monitoring by airport personnel, tower 
controllers and tenants were embraced to secure airport operations; 
10. The airport is secured by fences around airport perimeters, control of main gate and doors, 
and personal observation based on Airport Watch program; 
11. There is no emerging security vulnerability at the observed airport;  
12. The chance of security breach at the observed airport is very remote; and  
13. Additional security efforts and measures would incur extra cost associated with future 
operations. 
Q2 While there is no mandatory security program or rule for FAA FAR 139 Class IV non-
commercial airports, what could be the vulnerability affecting airport security when a large 
charter airliner is present? 
1. There was no x-ray screening mechanism at the observed airport while loading luggage and 
equipment; 
2. Airport gates or doors were not properly secured which allowed un-authorized personnel 
entering into airport apron when large aircraft were operating on the airside; 
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3. Access control system is dissimilar at each entrance to the airport property, which makes 
access control complicated; 
4. Warning signs attached to airport gates or doors were not in clear view to the public; 
5. Passenger manifests were found scattered around the terminal with names of all persons 
onboard and their respective seat assignments. 
6. Often visiting charter aircraft were unattended and unguarded during periods of darkness; 
7. No surveillance system present for the airport grounds or entrances; 
8. Security measure was based on routine visual surveillances done by airport staff and air traffic 
controllers;  
9. Control tower cannot monitor every corner of the airport due to buildings blocking line of 
sight;  
10. Airport emergency numbers are not posted visibly around all facilities  
11. There is no hazardous/suspicious person reporting system for an early security alert; and 
12.There is no airport security committee. 
Stage-2 findings 
The Stage-2 survey result not only concurs with the findings extracted from Stage-1 
study but also provides more insights for readers to understand the status of security measures 
and vulnerabilities among FAR 139 Class IV airports when accommodating large aircraft. 
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Q1. Without mandatory security enforcement, what is (are) the security measure(s) implemented 
by the FAA FAR 139 Class IV non-commercial airports when a large charter airliner is present? 
Within the past 12 months, there were twelve surveyed airports that hosted large aircraft 
(MTOW> 100,309 lbs.) chartered by universities. The aircraft included; B727, B737, B757, 
B767, A319, A320, A330, DC-9, MD-83, and C130. While embarking and disembarking 
passengers and freight, only eight airports provide surveillance by law enforcement personnel, 
TSA officers, airport/FBO staffers, security contractors, or security cameras. The security 
process also covers luggage screening; however, only 50% of all screened luggage was kept in a 
sterile environment before being placed on the aircraft. Pilots and flight attendants, FBO workers, 
airport employees, or passengers themselves moved the luggage and freight. Most surveyed 
airports are fenced with gated access controls and do have an official security program. When 
security programs were developed, the resources were obtained from government (DoT, TSA, 
and FAA), trade organizations (AAAE, NBAA, AOPA, and NATA), local law enforcement and 
fire department. The airport security program is shared with or supported by airport tenants such 
as FBOs, local fire department, State DoT, ATC, TSA, etc. Most surveyed airports participate in 
AOPA’s Airport Watch program; yet four surveyed airports do not. The AOPA Airport Watch 
program is also shared by all airport tenants, FBOs, pilots, law enforcement, emergency response 
groups or fire department, and ATC. Only eight of the fifteen airports with the security program 
indicated increased security response to DHS threat escalation. Only 35% of the security 
programs had been audited within a year. 20% of the programs had never been audited since 
their implementation. Most surveyed airports do have security coordinator, but seven surveyed 
respondents do not. While being the airport security coordinator, most also carry different duties 
such as emergency medical associate (EMA), an airport manager, airfield operations and 
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maintenance, a part of ARFF, or management and administration staff. There are only two 
security coordinators serving in the sole capacity. There are fifteen surveyed airports that do 
have a security committee, with six surveyed airports having none. The security committee 
members are selected from airports, FBO, local law enforcement, TSA and FAA. Only 28% of 
airports had a security committee that met regularly. 60% of all airports spent less than $100,000 
on security since September 11th, 2001. In the last 2 years that number increased to 85%. For an 
emerging security measure requirement for GA airports accommodating large charter aircraft, 
the respondents suggested: 1) high tensile electrical security gate, 2) security cameras, 3) 
Internet-based surveillance equipment, and 4) full-time security officers. Most airports indicated 
the need for CCTV systems at all access points and throughout the airfield. 
Q2. While there is no mandatory security program or rule for FAA FAR 139 Class IV non-
commercial airports, what could be the vulnerability affecting airport security when a large 
charter airliner is present? 
1. Some surveyed airports have never completed a security program audit;  
2. Four surveyed airports do not participate in any Airport Watch program; 
3. Six surveyed airports do not have a security committee;  
4. Some surveyed airports’ security response do not increase along with DHS’s threat escalation; 
5. Three surveyed airports do not have perimeter fences;  
6. While embarking and disembarking passengers, not all surveyed airports provide surveillance 
by law enforcement personnel, TSA officers, airport/FBO staffers, security contractors, or 
surveillance cameras; 
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7. Only five surveyed airports have done screening when loading luggage;  
8. Occasionally, luggage and freight are moved by passengers themselves; 
9. Nine surveyed airports also provide services and facilities to incumbent collegiate aviation 
programs. Most educational facilities receive no security audit; and  
10. It is almost impossible for charter carriers to implement PCSSP and TWSSP at FAR 139 
Class IV airports. 
Security Comments 
Based on the identified vulnerabilities, the following recommendations should be enacted with 
financial assistance from the government: 
1. Immediately develop, revise, and audit security programs;  
2. Inspect and renew perimeter fences to a regulatory standard;  
3. Replace and enlarge warning signs around airport;  
4. Form an airport security committee, empowered with sufficient authority and responsibility;  
5. All access doors and gates to airside or restricted areas must be immediately controlled and 
monitored allowing only authorized personnel to enter;  
6. Develop a low-cost metal detector, x-ray machine or screening procedures for luggage and 
cargo avoiding hazardous materials (HAZMAT) or prohibited items;  
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7. Provide airport security education (hijack history, threat theories, security programs: PCSSP, 
TFSSP, SFBOP, and LASP trainings) to local FBOs, catering providers, contractors, airport 
workers, passengers, related employees and incumbent collegiate aviation programs; 
8. Incorporate municipal or campus police force for passenger protection, ID check, and ground 
safety when boarding/deplaning passengers, loading equipment or carry-on luggage using large 
jet charters; 
9. Ensure security program implementation conducted by charter carriers;  
10. Develop aircraft ground monitor or surveillance system that can identify unauthorized 
intrusion of an aircraft when unattended;  
11. Publish a digital bulletin board broadcasting security information to airport users, workers, 
and visitors;  
12. Based on Security Management System (SeMS) concept, an airport vulnerability reporting 
system should be developed as a proactive security tool;  
13. Develop a real-time safety and security protocol based on the risk analysis result from airport 
SeMS program; 
14. Allocate internal funding to initiate airport security guidelines, measures or programs; and 




While concealed explosives could be possibly introduced into an aircraft (e.g. Megrahi’s 
bombs on Pan Am Flight 103 on December 21, 1988 or Abdulmutallab’s underwear explosives 
on Northwest Flight 253 on December 25, 2009) at a large commercial airport where security 
measures are intensive, it could be much easier for al-Qaeda to bypass security checkpoints at a 
FAR 139 Class IV airport as security measures are basically non-existing. From time to time, the 
operational nature of a FAR 139 Class IV airport is similar to that of FAR 139 Class I, II, and III 
airports which provide passenger service and cargo transportation by flying large charter aircraft 
such as Boeing 737, 757, 767 and Airbus 330. While potential threats could breach security 
measures at FAR 139 Class I, II, and III airports, Class IV airports should also be protected 
whenever short-term-high-capacity activities exist. Not only should the implementation of 
PCSSP and TFSSP be thoroughly and collaboratively conducted by air carriers, airports, and 
FBOs, the low-cost advanced security measures securing airports must be in place. Gate/entrance 
control and surveillance systems are urgently required to restrict and screen unauthorized 
personnel to access to AOA/restricted areas. Unattended aircraft at unmonitored GA apron (both 
day and night) simply presents an easy target for vandalism, theft, or sabotage. Airport security 
could not be achieved without the synergy from government, airport authority, airport tenants, 
airline operators, passengers and the public and needs to be integrated into the overall 
safety/security fabric of the airport professional oversight plan. When large charter aircraft fly in 
and out of FAR 139 Class IV airports periodically taking important passengers to and from their 
destinations, security measures must be efficiently and effectively elevated and funded by AIP or 
possible financial sources. In addition to the short-term-high- capacity activities at FAR 139 
Class IV airports often associated with sporting events, the major commercial airports might also 
use these airports for safety or security divert airports, so the preplanning for special events 
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security enhancements would also facilitate such commercial operation divert planning. The 
utilization of GA airports could become more attractive and cost effective. Proactively planning 
for the increase in FAR 139 Class IV airport utilization, along with acknowledging the potential 
security challenges is a valid business practice as well as a liability and security responsibility. 
The potential of security breach leading to a passenger’s injury/fatality, aircraft hijack or facility 
damage at a GA airport is remote, but certain peak high value operations significantly increase 
their vulnerability and highlight their likelihood. Where security vulnerability exists the industry 
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General Aviation Airport Security Practices 
 
The following questions pertain specifically to general aviation airport security. Please answer all questions, if able, 
that are applicable to your airport. 
 
Does the airport have a security program in place?  
¨ Yes  
¨ No  
¨ Unsure 
 
If “yes,” does the security response escalate with DHS threat escalation? 




If “yes,” who is the plan shared with? (Please check all that apply) 
¨ Fixed base operators (FBO) 
¨ Local law enforcement   
¨ Local fire department 
¨ TSA  
¨ Unsure 
¨ Other (please explain):_________________________________________ 
 
Which of the following resources were used to help to develop your program? (Please check all that apply) 
¨ None  
¨ TSA  
¨ DOT  
¨ Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) 
¨ National Business Aviation Association (NBAA)  
¨ National Air Transportation Association (NATA)  
¨ American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE) 
¨ Hired consultant 
¨ Other (please specify): ______________________________________________________ 
 
Is the airport perimeter fenced?  
¨ Yes  
¨ No  
¨ Unsure 
 
If “yes,” how is access within this perimeter granted? (Please check all that apply) 
¨ Card readers 
¨ Lock and key  
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¨ Staffed checkpoints 
¨ Escorted access only  
¨ No restrictions  
¨ Other (please specify):____________________________________ 
 
Does the airport have in place an AOPA Airport Watch type of program? 
¨ Yes 
¨ No  
¨ Unsure of that program 
If “yes,” who is the plan shared with? 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Does your organization have an individual designated as the security coordinator? 
¨ Yes  
¨ No  
¨ Unsure 
 









Is there a security committee that meets regularly in place? 
¨ Yes 
¨ No  
¨ Unsure 
 
If “yes”, which of the list below are represented on the committee?  
(Please check all that apply) 
¨ Airport staff  
¨ FBO  
¨ Other tenants  
¨ Local police  
¨ TSA representatives  
¨ FAA officials 
¨ Other (please specify): 
______________________________________________________  
 
When was the airport security programs last audited?  
¨ Less than 1 year  
¨ 2-3 years 
¨ Greater than three years 
¨ Never  
¨ Unsure 
 
Please estimate the amount that the airport has spent, in total, on security since September 11, 2009? 
¨ Less than $100,000  
¨ $100,000 to $500,000  
¨ $500,000 to $1 million  
¨ More than $1 million 
 
Please estimate the amount that the airport has spent, in total, on security the last two years? 
¨ Less than$100,000  
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¨ $100,000 to $500,000  
¨ $500,000 to $1 million 
¨ More than$1 million 
Please describe in the space below any unique security ideas, programs, or equipment that have been 




Irregular Operations with Large Transport Category Aircraft (Maximum Takeoff Weight (MTOW) > 
100,300 lbs.) 
 
How many university chartered aircraft of MTOW > 100,300 lbs. (B737, B757, A320, etc.) have used the airport’s 
facilities in the past 12 months? (Generally this is an aircraft with more than 61 passenger seats) 
¨ 1-2 
¨ 3-5 
¨ More than 5 
¨ Unsure 
 
If any aircraft larger of MTOW > 100,300 lbs. have been used what type were they? 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 





If “yes”, what type of surveillance was used, if any? (Please check all the apply) 
¨ Local law enforcement 
¨ TSA 
¨ Airport Staff 
¨ External security agency 
¨ Students 
¨ Security Cameras 
¨ Unsure  
¨ None 
 
Are there security personnel or surveillance equipment observing the deplaning/boarding of passengers? 
¨ Yes  
¨ No 
¨ Unsure  
 
If “yes”, what type of surveillance was used, if any? (Please check all the apply) 
¨ Local law enforcement 
¨ TSA 
¨ Airport Staff 
¨ External security agency 
¨ Students 
¨ Security Cameras 
¨ Unsure  
¨ None 
 
Is luggage screened prior to being place onboard the aircraft? 
¨ Yes 




If “yes”, is the luggage kept in a sterile environment before being loaded on the aircraft? 
¨ Yes  
¨ No 
¨ Unsure  
 
Who is responsible for moving bags and/or cargo in/out of the aircraft? 
¨ Pilots\Flight attendants 
¨ FBO employees 




Who is responsible for catering operations in/out of the aircraft? 
¨ Pilots\Flight attendants 
¨ FBO employees 




The questions listed below are intended specifically for those colleges or universities that have aviation management 
or flight programs. If you do not have any of the programs please continue to respondent information. 
Since September 11, 2009 has the university made changes in the curriculum to incorporate changes to security 
regulations and operations? 
¨ Yes  
¨ No  
¨ Unsure  
 
If “yes”, does the program receive an audit? 
¨ Yes  
¨ No 
 
If “yes”, how recently? 
¨ Less than 1 year  
¨ 2-3 years 
¨ More than three years 
¨ Unsure 
 
Has the university developed classes tailored specifically to airport security? 
¨ Yes  
¨ No  
¨ Unsure 
 
Does the university have as part of its curriculum classes that are tailored specifically to the needs of general 
aviation airports? 
¨ Yes  
¨ No  
¨ Unsure 
 
Has the university worked with surrounding general aviation airports to develop security programs and awareness? 
¨ Yes  
¨ No  
¨ Unsure 
 
Does the university work with airports on internship programs promoting safety and security education? 
¨ Yes  
¨ No  
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¨ Unsure  
 
Respondent Information 
Name: ___________________________________________________________  
Title: ____________________________________________________________ 
Airport: __________________________________________________________ 
Respondent telephone number: _______________________________________  




Airport State  Airport State 
KAEG NM  KLAF IN 
KAFW TX  KLBX TX 
KAHN GA  KLGU UT 
KAMW IA  KLRU NM 
KARA LA  KLWC KS 
KASG AR  KMDH IL 
KAUO AL  KMGW WV 
KAVQ AZ  KMIE IN 
KAWM AR  KMKC MO 
KBCT FL  KMOP MI 
KBFM AL  KMQY TN 
KBKL OH  KNFW TX 
KBMG IN  KNQA TN 
KBQR NY  KOSU OH 
KBTL MI  KOUN OK 
KBWG KY  KOWD MA 
KCOE ID  KPUW WA 
KCPS IL  KPVU UT 
KCVO OR  KRBD TX 
KDTO TX  KRSN LA 
KFOE KS  KSLE OR 
KFTY GA  KSTJ MO 
KFYV AR  KSWO OK 
KFTW TX  KTCL AL 
KGON CT  KTOI AL 
KHUF IN  KUGN IL 
KIAG NY  KUNV PA 
KIOW IA  KUOX MS 
KJBR AR  KVDF FL 
KJNX NC  KVPZ IN 
     KYIP MI 
 
 
